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The economic and fi  nancial crisis led to a strong increase 
in the public debt in the euro area countries, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Japan. Moreover, without 
a change of policy, the public debt will continue to expand 
in most of those countries.
This article describes the possible consequences and 
inherent risks of this situation. Those risks have also been 
illustrated by the problems which certain euro area coun-
tries have recently experienced in fi  nancing their public 
debt on the fi   nancial markets: those countries had to 
resort to the conditional fi  nancial assistance of the IMF 
and other European countries. A return to sustainable 
public fi  nances, not only in those countries but also in 
most of the other advanced economies, will require a sus-
tained consolidation effort in the coming years.
The fi  rst part of this article examines the movement in the 
public debt in the advanced economies, and the outlook 
in the absence of a change of policy. The second part con-
cerns the impact of the public debt on economic activity 
and infl  ation. The third part focuses on the need for fi  scal 
consolidation to reduce the public debt, and the recom-
mended strategies for achieving that objective. The fi  nal 
part sets out some conclusions.
1.  Overview of the public debt
1.1  Current situation 
The fi  nancial crisis which erupted in 2007 and intensifi  ed 
in 2008, and the ensuing economic recession had a very 
serious adverse impact on public fi  nances in most of the 
advanced economies. In particular, many countries saw a 
sharp rise in their debt ratio.
In the euro area, the debt ratio is set to rise from 66.2 % 
in 2007 to 87.7  % in 2011. Nevertheless, there are wide 
variations between countries. Ireland is seeing the big-
gest increase, at almost 90 percentage points of GDP. In 
Greece, which already had the highest debt ratio in the 
euro area before the crisis, the increase is expected to 
exceed 50 percentage points of GDP. Similarly, in Spain 
and Portugal the public debt has expanded consider-
ably, by over 30 percentage points. In other euro area 
countries, though the rise in the public debt is weaker, it 
is still substantial with increases ranging between 10 and 
20 percentage points. In no less than twelve euro area 
countries, the public debt exceeds the maximum refer-
ence value of 60  % of GDP stipulated by the Maastricht 
Treaty.
The euro area countries are not the only ones to see their 
debt level increase strongly between 2007 and 2011. 
Thus, over the same period the debt ratio of the United 
States will have risen from just over 60 % to almost 100 % 
of GDP. In Japan, where the debt ratio was already par-
ticularly high in 2007, it is set to rise by a further 50 per-
centage points to just under 240 % of GDP. In the United 
Kingdom, the debt ratio is likely to rise by 40 percentage 
points, but since it was still relatively modest in 2007, the 8
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Chart 2  Gross debt of General Government in the 
euro area countries
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debt is expected to remain lower at 84.2 % of GDP by the 
end of 2011.
Clearly, the surge in the debt ratio seen in the advanced 
countries in recent years is closely linked to the support 
measures for the financial sector at the time of the finan-
cial crisis and to the loss of revenue caused by the ensuing 
economic recession. However, the financial sector rescue 
operations account for only a small proportion of the 
total increase in the public debt since the outbreak of the 
crisis. The growth of the budget deficits is in fact the main 
factor determining that increase. Despite the economic 
recovery evident since 2010, the upward trend in the debt 
ratio of most of the advanced countries has persisted.
Since the start of the financial and economic crisis, the 
gross borrowing requirements of the public sector have 
been very substantial. It has been necessary to refinance 
part of the debt as it reaches maturity. Governments have 
also had to raise money to finance the injections of capital 
into the financial sector and their fast-growing budget 
deficits. However, up to mid-2010, the strong risk aver-
sion generated sustained demand for government securi-
ties considered as safe. That sustained demand and the 
accommodating policy of the central banks enabled most 
countries to borrow at favourable rates. However, since 
the final quarter of 2010, concerns about the solvency of 
certain countries have driven up interest rates. These per-
sistent worries combined with substantial gross refinanc-
ing requirements could increase the pressure on rates.
The financial and economic crisis has not affected all 
regions of the world in the same way. The emerging and 
developing countries, which – on average – had an initial 
public debt ratio below that of the advanced countries, 
have not seen their debt ratio rise, on average. In the 
emerging and developing countries, the debt ratio has 
remained relatively stable since the crisis, at around 35 % 
of GDP. This favourable dynamic reflects stronger growth 
and smaller deficits than in the advanced countries. The 
gap between the two groups of countries therefore wid-
ened after the financial and economic crisis.9
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(1)  Costs of pensions, health care and long-term care only.
Chart 4  Projections for the Public debt with no 
chanGe of Policy  (1)
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(1)  These projections are based on the assumption that the primary balance will 
deteriorate by the amount of the increase in age-related expenditure. In addition, 
it is assumed that nominal GDP growth will come to 3.75 % per annum and that 
the implicit interest rate on the public debt will ultimately tend towards 4 %.
1.2  Projections with no change of policy
In the absence of consolidation measures, the budget 
situation in the advanced countries is set to become even 
worse. Population ageing is likely to contribute to that 
deterioration by putting additional pressure on public 
expenditure on health care and pensions. Without a 
change of policy, that situation is likely to generate even 
bigger deficits and a strong rise in public debt levels. 
The ageing-related public expenditure is projected to rise 
by 2.6 percentage points of GDP by the year 2030 for 
the euro area countries, and as much as 5.1 percentage 
points by 2060. However, it should be noted that there 
are major variations between the euro area countries. 
The United States, Japan and the United Kingdom will 
also have to cope with a substantial rise in age-related 
public spending. In most of the advanced economies, 
the sustainability of public finances is therefore a serious 
problem. To avoid a marked deterioration in the budget 
position of those countries, fundamental adjustments are 
needed.
To demonstrate that the current budgetary policy is unsus-
tainable, it is possible to simulate what will happen to 
public debt levels if there is no change of policy. This exer-
cise clearly shows the exponential growth of the public 
debt in most of the advanced countries.  Debt levels in the euro area would exceed 180 % of GDP 
in 2030. None of the euro area countries would escape 
this vicious spiral. In some countries such as Greece and 
Ireland, the debt would even reach levels equivalent to 
3 or 4 times their GDP. This exponential growth of the 
public debt would not be confined to the euro area coun-
tries. In fact, without a change of policy, the public debt of 
the United Kingdom could amount to three times its GDP 
in 2030, while the public debt of the United States would 
exceed that figure by then. In Japan, the debt ratio could 
actually be more than four times GDP in 2030.
Thus, it is clear that all the advanced countries will be 
forced to act in order to prevent their financial situa-
tion from becoming unsustainable. Some countries have 
already announced measures to restore sound, sustain-
able public finances. Nonetheless, many countries have 
yet to put such measures in place.
2.  What is the economic impact of 
the public debt ?
The impact of fiscal policy – and hence of the public 
debt – on economic growth and other economic vari-
ables has always been the subject of lively debate among 
economists. Following the increase in the public debt in 10
most of the advanced countries, this subject is more topi-
cal than ever.
This chapter examines the main current viewpoints on 
this question. It begins with some theoretical considera-
tions concerning the optimum and maximum government 
debt ratios. Next, it focuses on the central question of this 
article : the impact of the public debt on economic activity. 
The chapter ends by considering the potential implications 
for inflation of the scale and pattern of the public debt.
2.1  Theoretical considerations concerning 
the optimum and maximum public debt ratios
The public debt tends to increase the disposable income 
of the current generation while – ceteris paribus – reduc-
ing that of future generations. It therefore seems obvious 
to assess the debt level in an intergenerational framework. 
In that context, the public debt and deficits are acceptable 
if they facilitate the expansion of production capacity 
and if the return on the public financial intervention thus 
financed outweighs the costs of the debt. By compar-
ing those costs and the return on public intervention, it 
is therefore possible to determine the optimum level of 
the public debt. Government intervention may concern 
investment expenditure on infrastructure, education, the 
operation of public institutions, security and a reduction 
in taxation in order to moderate its adverse impact on 
economic growth. The criterion of intergenerational neu-
trality – which means that each generation should make 
an equivalent net contribution to the government – also 
requires inclusion in the analysis of the impact of demog-
raphy on that neutrality  : with the prospect of significant 
population ageing, it seems appropriate to anticipate the 
increased costs in the form of pensions and health care for 
the elderly, and to ensure that they are financed partly by 
the current generation.
In practice, however, it is difficult to determine the optimal 
level of the public debt. First, the concept of an equivalent 
net contribution to government from each generation can 
be defined in absolute or relative terms. Moreover, it is 
extremely hard to measure the economic return on public 
intervention. It is therefore difficult to quantify the level at 
which the return on public intervention financed by the 
debt is lower than the cost of the public debt. Owing to 
these methodological problems, the empirical literature 
on the optimal debt level is fairly limited, and the findings 
are very divergent.
Nevertheless, it is evident that fiscal policy does not 
necessarily correspond to what might be considered the 
macroeconomic optimum. Thus, in past decades, the 
governments of a good many countries have shown 
a lack of fiscal discipline and have therefore increased 
their debt levels. The literature attributes that lack of 
fiscal discipline to the “deficit bias”. This says that the 
democratic decision-making process may encourage 
deviation from the optimal fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may 
be too improvident if the population focuses essentially 
on the short-term advantages of lower taxes or higher 
spending, without always being aware of the potential 
adverse repercussions on the budget in the long term 
of an expansionary fiscal policy. Political decision-makers 
may tend to play on this in order to increase their chances 
of re-election. There may also be a preference for deliber-
ately favouring current generations and transferring the 
burden of the debt to future generations. The concept 
known in game theory as the ‘common pool problem’ 
offers another explanation for the deficit bias. In regard 
to fiscal policy, this concept means that each interest 
group or each party in a coalition government looks 
after its own interests, so that the budget deficit and the 
public debt may exceed the optimum levels. The deficit 
bias and its undesirable effects may be counteracted by 
independent institutions and rules imposing restrictions 
on the budget.
Apart from the concept of the optimal debt, the litera-
ture also examines the concept of the maximum accept-
able public debt, corresponding to a country’s maximum 
capacity to repay its debts. The current level of public debt 
is, by definition, equal to the discounted value of future 
primary balances. The literature refers to the concept of 
inter-temporal budget constraint. According to this con-
straint, the higher the public debt ratio, the bigger the 
future primary balances need to be.
Consequently, the maximum acceptable debt ratio 
corresponds to the discounted value of the maximum 
acceptable future primary balances. The primary bal-
ances can only increase via an expansion of public rev-
enues or a restriction on public spending. The maximum 
acceptable debt ratio is therefore determined by the 
maximum acceptable level of public revenues and the 
minimum acceptable level of public primary expendi-
ture. Those levels cannot be fixed only on the basis 
of economic considerations  : it is essentially social and 
political considerations that may set the limits here. If 
the current level of the public debt exceeds the dis-
counted value of the future primary balances that the 
population is prepared to generate, then sooner or later 
there will be a problem of default on the public debt. 
However, it is extremely difficult to quantify the theo-
retical concept of the maximum debt ratio. Moreover, 
the maximum acceptable debt ratio may vary from one 
country to another.11
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2.2  Impact of the public debt on GDP
2.2.1    Short- and long-term effects of a reduction in 
the public debt
The theoretical and empirical literature concerning the 
impact of fiscal policy on economic activity is extensive, 
but it does not offer a clear answer to the question of the 
link between fiscal policy and economic activity. In fact, 
the impact depends very much on circumstances, which 
may vary considerably over time and from one country 
to another. Here it is crucial to distinguish between the 
short-term economic impact of the public debt and its 
long-term effects.
short-term impact
In the short term, the measures taken to consolidate the 
budget are likely to depress economic growth. In fact, 
most empirical studies show that the budget multipli-
ers – which indicate the extent to which a given fiscal 
stimulus influences activity growth – are positive in the 
short term. 
However, the scale of a consolidation plan’s short-term 
negative impact on economic activity varies according to 
the measures adopted. Measures relating to public con-
sumption and investment have a relatively major impact 
on economic activity, whereas measures concerning trans-
fers – such as taxes or social benefits – have a weaker 
effect. The reason is that the latter have only an indirect 
effect in modifying consumption or investment, via an 
adjustment to the incomes of households or companies. 
The degree to which households and firms face liquid-
ity constraints or credit restrictions is also important for 
ascertaining the impact of tax increases or social benefit 
cuts on economic growth. 
Moreover, it seems that the negative effect of consolida-
tion measures on economic growth in the short term is 
weaker – or even practically non-existent – if the public 
finance situation deteriorates and that situation is con-
sidered worrying. In fact, the consolidation measures 
may avoid an interest rate rise, which would curb private 
investment. Moreover, they may lead to a reduction in the 
savings ratio, e.g. owing to a reduction in precautionary 
savings by households thanks to a revival in confidence 
after a period of budget difficulties  (1). In that case, the 
negative impact on economic activity in the short term 
could be very small. In the current situation, these factors 
seem relevant, so that fiscal consolidation will not neces-
sarily have a very negative effect on business activity.
The scale of the impact of consolidation also depends on 
the economic and monetary environment in which it is 
implemented. Where consolidation takes place in a small, 
open economy, its short-term impact is less than in the 
case of simultaneous consolidation in a number of coun-
tries, which will have a bigger restraining effect on global 
demand. Next, if the central banks are able to adopt an 
accommodating policy, consolidation is less damaging to 
growth. However, if interest rates are close to zero, central 
banks have less scope for compensating for the potential 
decline in global demand and inflation caused by increas-
ing revenues and cutting public spending. Finally, the 
presence of a fixed exchange rate tends to reinforce the 
negative impact of consolidation on growth, compared to 
a system of floating exchange rates, which generally plays 
a significant buffer role. 
long-term impact
In contrast to the short-term effects, the long-term 
impact of fiscal consolidation ensuring the sustainabil-
ity of public finances is undeniably positive. The effects 
include a decline in long-term interest rates, owing to a 
contraction in the supply of government securities on the 
market and a reduction in risk premiums. In addition, the 
reduction in interest charges resulting from consolidation 
frees up more resources for productive public expenditure 
or for reductions in the burden of taxation and parafiscal 
levies. 
According to the literature, fiscal consolidation based 
on spending cuts is more effective and has a more 
favourable impact on economic growth in the long 
term than that based on a rise in public revenues. That 
is particularly the case if the budget restraint applies to 
spending other than that which is generally considered 
productive, such as expenditure on investment, educa-
tion, research and innovation. The scale of the impact 
of consolidation on economic activity will depend on 
the use made of the money saved by budget austerity 
(see section 2.2.3).
2.2.2  Transmission mechanisms
There are several ways in which an increase (reduction) in 
the public debt may have a negative (positive) influence 
on economic activity in the long term. There are three 
main transmission channels.
(1)  According to the Ricardian equivalence theory, an increase in the public debt 
is offset by an increase in the private savings ratio, because individuals take 
account of the prospect of a future tax increase and a future public spending 
cut. However, the Ricardian equivalence theory is based on a number of 
unrealistic assumptions, e.g. that households face no budget constraints and 
that households take account of an infinite time horizon and non-distorting, 
lump-sum taxes. Consequently, though an increase in the public debt may lead to 
a higher private savings ratio, that will not be enough to compensate entirely for 
the decline in national net savings.12

























(1)  This diagram shows the main transmission mechanisms whereby a higher public debt leads, in the long term, to lower GDP. If the public debt is reduced, the opposite effects 
are seen.
First, an increase in the public debt generally corresponds 
to a decline in the positive savings or an increase in the 
negative savings of the government, leading to a reduc-
tion in the volume of net national savings. This tends to 
push up interest rates. The rise in interest rates causes a 
fall in investment and in the growth of the capital stock. 
The slower pace of capital accumulation hampers the 
innovations that improve productivity. The result is lower 
labour productivity. It should be noted that the impact on 
interest rates depends on the size of the region affected 
by the rise in the public debt. If that rise is confined to 
a small open economy, the impact on market interest 
rates will be very modest. Conversely, if the debt expands 
simultaneously in countries forming a large economic 
region, the upward pressure on market interest rates will 
be substantial.
In addition, the increase in the debt leads to higher inter-
est charges. Those charges then take the place of produc-
tive expenditure – such as public investment in infrastruc-
ture – or are offset by higher taxation and an increase 
in the associated distortions. Depending on the fiscal 
measure adopted, there may be a negative impact on 
consumption (in the case of an increase in VAT and excise 
duty), on private investment (in the case of capital taxes), 
and on the labour supply (in the case of taxes on wages).
Finally, if the increase in the debt leads to the emergence 
of sovereign risk, the debt drives up the risk premiums. 
The higher premiums generate an increase in financing 
costs which may threaten the solvency of public finances. 
In addition, that may lead to an increase in the interest 
rates applied to individuals and firms.
Where substantial debts are combined with adverse 
budgetary starting conditions, that amplifies the nega-
tive and non-linear effect of a high debt level on interest 
rates. In this context, attention must be drawn to the 
importance of the initial budgetary, structural and insti-
tutional conditions, and the contagion effects emanating 
from the financial markets. Thus, factors such as weak 
or inadequate institutions, low private savings, a weak 
inflow of foreign capital, weak competitiveness of the 
national economy, high unemployment, a fragile banking 
sector or high sensitivity to contagion effects play a key 
role in determining the scale of the impact of the debt 
on interest rates. The impact of population ageing on the 
sustainability of public finances may also be an essential 
determinant.
The pattern of yield differentials on ten-year government 
securities in the euro area countries vis-à-vis the German 
Bund shows the great sensitivity of risk premiums on 13
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Chart 6  yield differentials between ten-year Government loans of euro area countries and the German bund




















































Source : Thomson Reuters Datastream.
government securities since the start of the financial and 
economic crisis. The movement in those risk premiums, 
particularly since 2010, shows that the financial markets 
made a steep upward revision to the default risk of certain 
countries, and that the financial markets may react sud-
denly and very vigorously.
The negative impact of the public debt on economic activ-
ity may also be felt via other transmission mechanisms, 
such as higher inflation expectations, greater uncertainty 
and increased macroeconomic volatility. The impact which 
expansion of the public debt may have on inflation expec-
tations is discussed in section 2.3.
It should also be noted that while the debt has a negative 
effect on growth, the opposite causal relation is equally 
true. In other words, a deterioration in economic growth 
tends to increase the debt ratio.
2.2.3  Empirical findings
link between the public debt and economic growth
The data covering the period 1970-2007 indicate that 
there is a significant negative link between the level of the 
public debt and per capita GDP growth at constant prices. 
Chart 7  Public debt and economic Growth


















































































Public debt in % of GDP (1)
Source : Kumar and Woo (2010).
(1)  The figures show the initial level of the public debt at the start of each five-year 
period and the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita at constant prices 
for each period.14
Chart 9  lonG-term effects of a Permanent 
10 PercentaGe Point reduction in the 
Public debt/GdP ratio of the G3  (1)  ,  (2)
(G3 = euro area, United States, Japan ; in %, unless otherwise 
stated)
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Source : IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2010).
(1)  Simulation of the IMF’s global integrated monetary and fiscal model, assuming 
that money saved on interest charges is used to cut taxes on labour incomes.
(2)  The findings take no account of the probability that the public debt reduction will 
drive down the risk premiums on market interest rates. That fall would reinforce 
and accelerate the long-term positive effects on output.
Chart 8  Public debt and Gross caPital formation















































































Public debt in % of GDP (1)
Source : Kumar and Woo (2010).
(1)  The figures show the initial level of the public debt at the start of each five-year 
period and the average annual gross capital formation in % of GDP for each 
period.
During that period, the advanced economies with a debt 
ratio below 30  % of GDP achieved an average increase 
in per capita GDP at constant prices of 3.2  %, whereas 
growth came to only 1.9  % for the advanced economies 
with a debt ratio in excess of 90 % of GDP. The link is less 
clear for the emerging countries, but here too the average 
per capita GDP growth at constant prices is strongest in 
the countries with the lowest public debt. Finally, in the 
developing countries, per capita GDP growth at constant 
prices is clearly higher the lower the public debt.
In the case of the emerging and developing countries, 
a negative link is also evident for the period 1970-2007 
between the level of the public debt and gross fixed 
capital formation. This finding seems to confirm the exist-
ence of a significant transmission channel which operates 
via gross capital formation. Conversely, for the advanced 
economies, there is no clear link between the level of 
public debt and gross fixed capital formation.
A number of empirical studies have tried to determine the 
limit which the debt must not exceed in order to avoid a 
severe adverse impact on economic growth. Those stud-
ies  (1) confirm the existence of a negative, non-linear causal 
relationship between the debt and GDP. In fact, they 
conclude that a low debt level has no effect on economic 
growth, whereas beyond a certain level, the debt has a 
negative impact on growth. According to these studies, 
the critical debt level is between 90 and 100 % of GDP. 
However, in some cases, the empirical findings do not 
bear out this threshold effect for debt levels equivalent to 
– or above – 90 to 100 % of GDP. That is notably the case 
in Japan, where the debt exceeds 200 % of GDP. This criti-
cal threshold therefore needs to be analysed and defined 
country by country, taking account of the domestic eco-
nomic, budgetary and institutional characteristics. Market 
perception of solvency risk and macroeconomic stability is 
another crucial factor.
long-term effects of a permanent reduction in 
the public debt
Although fiscal consolidation generally has a detrimental 
effect in the short term for countries which have no major 
solvency problems, in the long term a rebalancing of the 
budget is likely to be beneficial. Thus, on the basis of the 
IMF simulations  (2), cutting the debt by 10  % in the euro 
(1)  See for example Kumar and Woo (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a), 
Chercherita and Rother (2010) and Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib (2010).
(2)  For more details, see IMF (2010c).15
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Chart 10  idem chart 9, imPact on GdP at constant 
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Source : IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2010).
area, the United States and Japan would boost output not 
just in those countries but also in the rest of the world. 
The rebalancing introduced in this simulation exercise 
comprises permanent cuts in public consumption and 
transfers. Deficit reduction would lead to a steady decline 
in real interest rates, thus stimulating private investment. 
A 10  % cut in the debt ratios would drive interest rates 
down by 30 basis points. That decline in interest rates 
would boost private investment, leading to an increase 
in the physical capital stock and output in the long term. 
The IMF points out that the improvement in output in the 
countries analysed also produces benefits for the rest of 
the world in the form of the expansion of exports to those 
countries. In the IMF exercise, the capital stock would 
thus expand by 2.1 % in the countries concerned, and by 
1.6 % in the rest of the world.
In addition, lower interest rates would mean a reduction 
in debt interest charges. If the savings on interest are 
used to cut taxes on labour incomes, that will increase 
the labour supply and, consequently, output. If the sav-
ings on interest are used to reduce the taxes on capital 
incomes, the long-term effects on growth could be even 
more favourable, via increased investment in the private 
sector. Conversely, if the savings are used to cut taxes on 
consumption or to increase public transfers, the increase 
in output would be more modest. 
During the first three years of consolidation, the costs are 
likely to outweigh the benefits. Subsequently, the benefits 
should always outweigh the costs of fiscal consolidation. 
After five years, the gains resulting from consolidation 
would exactly offset the losses suffered in the first three 
years. In the long term, GDP would increase by 1.4  % in 
the euro area, the United States and Japan, and 0.8 % in 
the rest of the world.
It should be noted that this IMF simulation takes no 
account of the positive effect of debt reduction on the 
perception of sovereign risk, and hence on the risk pre-
mium on government securities. This is another factor 
which would help to cut the cost of financing the debt 
and the interest charges, reinforcing and accelerating the 
positive long-term effects on output. 
2.3  Impact of the public debt on inflation
An increase in the public debt may, in certain cases, 
heighten the risk of inflation. If the public debt grows 
strongly, the government may in fact be tempted to 
reduce the value of that debt by generating inflation. 
That happens if the public debt is monetised. In that 
case, the government issues debts which are bought by 
the central bank, that purchase usually being manda-
tory. The money which the government thus receives 
from the central bank is used to finance the budget 
deficit. The money supply expands substantially as a 
result, and there is inflationary pressure which may lead 
to hyperinflation.
All periods of hyperinflation which have occurred in the 
past have originated from a budget crisis which may be 
due to war, extremely negative economic shocks, or bad 
policies. A budget crisis may prevent the government 
from raising finance on the capital market, or force it to 
borrow at very high interest rates, so that it resorts to 
monetisation of the public debt.
If the public debt increases, and if the economic agents 
take account of a greater likelihood of monetisation of 
the debt, inflation expectations – and hence also current 
inflation – may rise. In that case, apart from the transmis-
sion channels already described, there would be an addi-
tional negative impact on economic activity.
Whether or not this risk materialises depends in particular 
on institutional factors. Thus, it will not be possible to 
monetise the public debt if the law prohibits the monetary 
financing of public spending or deficits, as is the case in 
the European Union. The independence of the central 
bank and a clear mandate geared to the maintenance of 16
price stability are also important to prevent the risk of a 
strong rise in the public debt triggering higher inflation.
During the period after the Second World War, a rising 
debt ratio was accompanied by higher inflation in certain 
developing or emerging countries. In contrast, during that 
same period, the increase in the debt ratio in the advanced 
countries did not cause inflationary pressure. The existence 
of institutions independent of the government for decid-
ing on monetary policy, and the role of those institutions in 
monitoring inflation, were certainly crucial here.
Be that as it may, a situation featuring unsustainable 
public finances makes it considerably more difficult to 
conduct monetary policy, which must be centred on price 
stability. If such a situation were to fuel inflation expecta-
tions, there would inevitably be a tightening of monetary 
policy in the form of a rise in short-term interest rates. In 
addition, tensions could appear between the central bank 
and the government which, having a substantial public 
debt, is very sensitive to interest rate increases.
3.  Strategies for reducing the public 
debt
The accumulation of historically high levels of public 
debt is problematic for several reasons. First, high and 
rising public debt levels cause problems for the sus-
tainability of public finances and pose solvency risks. 
The resulting increase in the risk premium makes it 
more expensive for countries to borrow. The financial 
markets already doubt the solvency of the State in the 
case of some countries such as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. In addition, the rise in interest rates caused 
by the increase in the public debt may have an adverse 
effect on long-term growth and productivity, e.g. as 
a result of slower private investment. Moreover, the 
budgetary impact of population ageing will further 
aggravate the problem of the sustainability of public 
finances. Finally, the uncertainty over sustainability may 
reduce the capacity of monetary policy to control infla-
tion expectations and to exert a favourable influence on 
the real economy.
Consequently, the consolidation of public finances is 
unavoidable in almost all the advanced countries. To that 
end, there is an urgent need for credible consolidation 
programmes. Nonetheless, the strategy may vary from 
one country to another. It will be more urgent and more 
stringent in the countries facing high and rising risk pre-
miums. For those countries, postponing the consolidation 
would not only be likely to increase the cost of financing 
the public debt, it would also exacerbate macroeconomic 
instability. The cost of non-intervention could therefore 
be even greater. The heavily indebted governments must 
therefore embark on adjustment programmes without 
delay. For the countries with lower risk premiums, consoli-
dation is no less urgent, but the adjustment can be made 
more gradually.
The three-pronged strategy formulated by the Stockholm 
European Council in March 2001 for addressing the chal-
lenge of population ageing is as relevant as ever in the 
current battle to restore sustainable public finances. That 
budgetary strategy consists in reducing the public debt, 
increasing the employment rate and productivity, and 
reforming the existing pension schemes, health care and 
care of the elderly.
First, almost all the advanced countries must achieve 
and maintain sound budgetary positions. In most of the 
advanced countries, the adjustment measures should con-
sist mainly of sharp reductions in public spending, which 
has edged upwards in recent years. However, it is neces-
sary to avoid reducing certain public spending regarded 
as productive, such as public expenditure on investment, 
research and innovation, or education. Yet in view of the 
scale of the fiscal consolidation required in most of the 
advanced countries, it is probably inevitable that consoli-
dation measures will have to be taken on the revenue side 
as well. The strengthening of the institutions and the fiscal 
rules is also essential to ensure successful consolidation. In 
this context, the strengthening of the budgetary frame-
work in the euro area is a positive sign. In this regard, the 
public debt will receive more attention than in the past. 
Thus, countries with a gross debt in excess of 60  % of 
GDP must reduce the gap between the two variables by 
at least 1/ 20th per annum.
Second, the countries must increase participation in the 
labour market and boost labour productivity, as effective 
use of those measures could augment potential GDP, thus 
also expanding the fiscal scope. Education is regarded as 
a decisive factor here.
Third, the countries must consider appropriate reforms to 
their pension schemes, health systems and arrangements 
for the care of the elderly. In fact, the constraints con-
nected with ageing-related expenditure will be particularly 
great in the light of the demographic pressures in many 
countries. It is therefore necessary to develop strategies 
to manage the increase in that expenditure. For the 
advanced countries, where the pressure is very great, it is 
essential to avoid an exponential rise in that expenditure 
in the medium term. In regard to pension spending, many 
advanced countries should introduce reforms in order to 
raise the effective retirement age. 17
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Conclusions
The financial crisis has not only brought a sharp economic 
slowdown and great uncertainty, it has also caused a 
deterioration in public finances in most of the advanced 
countries. That situation, characterised by a strong rise 
in public debt levels, is problematic. In certain countries, 
the increase in the level of the public debt actually raises 
solvency risks. In addition, the costs relating to ageing 
will aggravate the problem of the sustainability of public 
finances.
A debt reduction programme is therefore needed in 
most of the advanced countries. The consolidation 
will be more urgent for the countries whose solvency 
is called into question by the financial markets and 
which face high and rising risk premiums. For the other 
countries, the adjustment can be implemented more 
gradually. The consolidation measures should focus 
mainly on cuts in public spending. Given the scale of the 
adjustment needed in most of the advanced countries, 
measures which increase revenues will probably also be 
necessary. In the short term, the consolidation could 
have the effect of slowing the pace of economic activity. 
In the long term, however, budgetary rebalancing must 
certainly be beneficial. 
At present, some countries have already implemented 
consolidation measures while others – including Belgium – 
are yet to put most of the measures in place.18
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